Matthew Benton

"Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion," in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edn. M. Steup, B. Roeber, J. Turri, & E. Sosa, eds., 329-339. Wiley-Blackwell, 2024. journal (cont'd) "Disagreement and Religion," in Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Benton & Kvanvig, eds., 1-40. Oxford University Press, 2021.

Found on CV

Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming (SUNY Press, 2005), in Religious Studies 42 (2006): 488-492. entries, surveys reviews talks September 26-28, 2024

Found on CV

*Knowledge and God. Elements in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press, 2024.

Found on CV

*"The Epistemology of Interpersonal Relations," No us, 2024 (early view): 1-20.

Found on CV

"God as the Good," Eighth Theistic Ethics Workshop, Georgetown University, "Knowledge and Interpersonal Honesty," Western Washington University, Philosophy Colloquium, November 2023

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion. In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edn. B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri, & E. Sosa, eds. Wiley-Blackwell, 2023.

Found on CV

Peter van Elswyk and Matthew A. Benton. Assertion Remains Strong. Philosophical Studies, early view, 1-22, 2022.

Found on CV

*"Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism," Synthese 198 (2021): 1673-1689.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton and Jonathan L. Kvanvig, eds. Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford University Press, 2021.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism. Synthese 198: 1673-1689, 2021.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Disagreement and Religion. In Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Benton & Kvanvig, eds., 1-40, Oxford University Press, 2021.

Found on CV

*Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Edited with Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Oxford University Press, 2021.

Found on CV

Sanford Goldberg, ed., 245-263. Oxford University Press, 2020.

Found on CV

Oxford University Press, 2015. Revised 2020.

Found on CV

John Pittard, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment (Oxford University Press, 2020), in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Sept. 2020 (online, open-access).

Found on CV

Hud Hudson, A Grotesque in the Garden (Xerxes Press, 2017; 2nd edn., Eerdmans, 2020), in Faith & Philosophy 36 (2019): 271-275.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton and Peter van Elswyk. Hedged Assertion. In The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Sanford Goldberg, ed., 245-263. Oxford University Press, 2020.

Found on CV

"Epistemological Aspects of Hope," in The Moral Psychology of Hope. Claudia Bl oser and Titus Stahl, eds., 135-151. Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.

Found on CV

* "Lying, Belief, and Knowledge," in The Oxford Handbook of Lying. J org Meibauer, ed., 120-133. Oxford Handbooks in Linguistics. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Found on CV

"Religious Diversity and Disagreement," in The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, and N.J.J.L. Pedersen, eds., 185-195. Routledge, 2019.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Epistemological Aspects of Hope. In The Moral Psychology of Hope. Claudia Blöser and Titus Stahl, eds., 135-151. Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Lying, Belief, and Knowledge. In The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Jörg Meibauer, ed., 120-133, Oxford Handbooks in Linguistics, Oxford University Press, 2019.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Religious Diversity and Disagreement. In The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, and N.J.J. Pedersen, eds., 185-195. Routledge, 2019.

Found on CV

*"Lying, Accuracy, and Credence," Analysis 78 (2018): 195-198.

Found on CV

*"God and Interpersonal Knowledge," Res Philosophica 95 (2018): 421-447.

Found on CV

Benton, Hawthorne, & Rabinowitz, eds., 267-287. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Found on CV

"Introduction" (with co-editors John Hawthorne and Dani Rabinowitz), in Knowledge, Belief, and God, 1-10. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz, eds. Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Lying, Accuracy, and Credence. Analysis 78: 195-198, 2018.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. God and Interpersonal Knowledge. Res Philosophica 95: 421-447, 2018.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge. In Knowledge, Belief, and God. Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, & Dani Rabinowitz, eds., 267-287. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz. Introduction. In Knowledge, Belief, and God, edited by Benton, Hawthorne, and Rabinowitz, 1-10. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Found on CV

*Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Edited with John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Found on CV

*"Epistemology Personalized," The Philosophical Quarterly 67 (2017): 813-834.

Found on CV

"Lotteries and Prefaces," The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, 168-176. Routledge, 2017.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Epistemology Personalized. The Philosophical Quarterly 67: 813-834, 2017.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Lotteries and Prefaces. In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, ed., 168-176. Routledge, 2017.

Found on CV

*"Gricean Quality," No us 50 (2016): 689-703.

Found on CV

*"Expert Opinion and Second-Hand Knowledge," Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 92 (2016): 492-508.

Found on CV

"Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had," Episteme 13 (2016): 471-479.

Found on CV

* "Evil and Evidence" (with John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig. Vol. 7 (2016): 1-31.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Gricean Quality. Nous 50: 689-703, 2016.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Expert Opinion and Second-Hand Knowledge. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 92: 492-508, 2016.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had. Episteme 13: 471-479, 2016.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs. Evil and Evidence. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7: 1-31, 2016.

Found on CV

Timothy Williamson, Tetralogue: I'm Right, You're Wrong (Oxford University Press, 2015), in Marginalia Review of Books, March 17, 2015.

Found on CV

Max Baker-Hytch and Matthew A. Benton. Defeatism Defeated. Philosophical Perspectives 29: 40-66, 2015.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Paul Grice. In Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Edited by Duncan Pritchard. Oxford University Press, 2015. Revised 2020, 2015.

Found on CV

*"Iffy Predictions and Proper Expectations" (with John Turri), Synthese 191 (2014): 1857-1866.

Found on CV

* "Believing on Authority," European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2014): 133- 144.

Found on CV

* "Knowledge Norms," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014): ISSN 2161-0002.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton and John Turri. Iffy Predictions and Proper Expectations. Synthese 191: 1857-1866, 2014.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Believing on Authority. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6: 133-144, 2014.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Knowledge Norms. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002. https://iep.utm.edu/kn-norms/, 2014.

Found on CV

*"Dubious Objections from Iterated Conjunctions," Philosophical Studies 162 (2013): 355-358.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Dubious Objections from Iterated Conjunctions. Philosophical Studies 162: 355-358, 2013.

Found on CV

*"Assertion, Knowledge, and Predictions," Analysis 72 (2012): 102-105.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Assertion, Knowledge, and Predictions. Analysis 72: 102-105, 2012.

Found on CV

*"Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion," Analysis 71 (2011): 684-687.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Analysis 71: 684-687, 2011.

Found on CV

*"The Modal Gap: the Objective Problem of Lessing's Ditch(es) and Kierkegaard's Subjective Reply," Religious Studies 42 (2006): 27-44.

Found on CV

Matthew A. Benton. The Modal Gap: the Objective Problem of Lessing's Ditch(es) and Kierkegaard's Subjective Reply. Religious Studies 42: 27-44, 2006.

Found on CV

*"Assertion Remains Strong" (with Peter van Elswyk), Philosophical Studies 180

Found on CV